

# Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies<sup>☆</sup>

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## Abstract

We investigate trends and cross-national variation in the impact of class, religious, and gender cleavages on voting behavior in six advanced capitalist democracies in the postwar period. Earlier research on cleavage voting has been criticized for utilizing outdated “two-class” models of class structure, simplistic left/right party distinctions, flawed statistical approaches, and incompatible and/or limited of cross-national empirical evidence. We take such criticisms seriously and seek to overcome them. Using multinomial logistic regression models, we analyze data from a new dataset, the International Social Cleavages and Politics (ISCP) file, which contains comparable, over-time cross-national data from 112 nationally representative election surveys of voters in six Western democracies in the period 1964–1998. The six countries

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examined in the paper (Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) are unique because of the existence of time series data available for all three cleavages. Our analyses examine the changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages for up to five distinct party families for each country. Unskilled workers have become less distinctive in their partisan alignments over time, but other classes have experienced offsetting changes, yielding little evidence of a universal decline in the class cleavage. Further analyses suggest an important degree of stability in the aggregated effects of all social cleavages, while also revealing significant cross-national differences and trends in the magnitude of specific cleavages. These results refine debates concerning the possible decline of social cleavages; implications for research are discussed in conclusion.

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## 1. Introduction

In their influential 1967 theoretical statement about the sources of cross-national variation in the social bases of voting behavior and political parties in West European capitalist democracies, Lipset and Rokkan characterized a whole generation of research on political divisions in these democracies as reflecting a complex set of historical processes triggered by two revolutions, a “national” revolution and an “industrial” revolution (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The resulting social cleavages produced by these twin revolutions were viewed as having produced stable patterns of group-based political conflict, expressed through modern party systems. The most important of these cleavages included those based on class inequality (triggered by the industrial revolution), and on religion, ethnicity, and language (triggered by national revolutions). Although the magnitude of each of such cleavages varied from country to country (depending on local political history), Lipset and Rokkan hypothesized that once a cleavage structure was established it tended to provide a durable (or “frozen”) basis for political conflict expressed through the ballot box (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50; cf. Rose, 1974; Bartolini and Mair, 1990).

Social science research on the impact of social cleavages on voting behavior waned after the 1960s, however, as researchers increasingly looked to more proximate cognitive, economic, and/or cultural, ideological, or partisanship factors in developing models of political behavior (Franklin et al., 1992; Carmines and Huckfeldt, 1996). In the course of this intellectual shift, the so-called “sociological model” of voting behavior (in which the patterning of voter-party alignments was attributed to sociodemographic group memberships) came to be heavily criticized, even at times dismissed (see Achen, 1992).

Summarizing the results of a collaborative set of national studies of change in the role of social cleavages in shaping voter alignments, Franklin (1992, p. 388), concluded that “widespread reduction in variance explained by social structure has gone far enough in some countries to vitiate the...expected linkage between social cleavages and party strengths”. In similar fashion, Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1997) influential thesis about the rising importance of postmaterialist values vigorously asserts that value conflict is displacing traditional forms of political cleavage such as those

based on class or religion (see also [Dogan, 1995](#)). Reviewing the state-of-the-art in voting studies in the mid-1990s, [Dalton \(1996, p. 345\)](#), argues that “one of the major findings from the last decade of electoral research holds that social positions no longer determine political positions as they did when social alignments were solidly frozen” (see also [Lipset, 1981, pp. 503–23](#); [Rose and McAllister, 1986](#); [Franklin et al., 1992](#); [Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993, esp. pp. 199–200](#); [Clark et al., 1993](#); [Pakulski and Waters, 1996](#)). Taken as a whole, this emerging international consensus asserts that voters are increasingly making political choices independently of their social group memberships or identities.

Claims about the declining significance of social cleavages on voting behavior have, however, been challenged in some other recent work, particularly in relation to class voting (e.g., [Heath et al., 1991](#); [Weakliem and Heath, 1994, 1999](#); [Goldthorpe, 1996](#); [Evans, 1999](#)), religion ([Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 5](#)), and gender ([Huber and Stephens, 2000](#)). Although methodologically pluralistic, these studies have largely shared the use of newer theoretical conceptualizations of class, religion, and party systems. They have also applied statistical models that distinguish between over-time changes in voter alignments affecting all groups from those that have group-specific impacts (a distinction first introduced by [Heath et al. \(1985\)](#)). The analyses reported in these studies suggest that claims of declining social influence on the vote are overstated, and that the more typical pattern is one of persisting social cleavage influence (for recent summary, see [Evans, 1999](#)).

The heated debates between the preceding camps remain unresolved. Almost all past studies have considered these questions in single-country contexts, with the modest number of cross-national comparisons generally involving incompatible datasets, different measures of parties, less detailed measures of class and religion, or different methods of analysis (for exceptions, see [Nieuwbeerta, 1995, 1996](#) and [Weakliem and Heath, 1999](#)). In this paper, by contrast, we exploit a fully compatible cross-national pooled dataset which recodes national election surveys and other cross-national surveys with information about individual-level voting behavior into compatible measures across countries. We focus on six countries with significant variation in, and time-series national election data on, three major social cleavages: class, religion, and gender. These countries (Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) represent a range of different types of party systems, welfare state regimes, and social structures (cf. [Esping-Andersen, 1990](#); [Powell, 2000](#)).

We seek to contribute to the literature on social cleavages (as well as recent debates over the possibility of declining cleavage impact). We introduce three significant innovations into these debates. First, we incorporate questions about class voting—the most commonly studied social cleavage—alongside a broader cross-national and over-time analysis of the religious and gender cleavage.<sup>2</sup> This allows us to directly examine a possibility ignored in other studies, namely, that trends in other

<sup>2</sup> In addition to the class, religion, and gender cleavages, other social cleavages such as race and ethnicity, language, region, union membership, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence might also be considered. While our cross-national data limit our capacity to carry out systematic investigations of these other cleavages, this by no means suggests they are unimportant.

cleavages are related to (or alternatively, independent of) changes in the class cleavage. Second, we apply a systematic approach to measuring the magnitudes of these three cleavages in different national contexts, one which allows us to compare their relative weight across different societies and time periods. Third, we apply a new statistical measure—first introduced by Brooks and Manza (1997)—for assessing the overall magnitude of these three cleavages on the party preferences of voters in each country. This measure allows us to assess whether the combined impact of the cleavages in our analyses have changed over time.

We emphasize that the survey data we analyze spans the time period from the 1970s through the 1990s. Notwithstanding the further utility of even broader analyses spanning additional countries and periods of time, the comparative and historical scope of the current study nevertheless provides useful leverage in light of the country-specific focus of much past research. The theoretical focus of debates concerning patterns of change and cleavage voting, we would also note, centers on the post-1960s era, enabling the results we develop to help in advancing recent controversies over the interrelationships of social cleavages and political behavior.

Our presentation is in four parts. The first part discusses recent debates over social cleavages and political change, providing a point of departure for the rest of the paper. Part two describes our data and statistical models. Part three presents the main results of our investigation, including analyses of (1) over-time and cross-national trends in the magnitude of the class, religious, and gender cleavages; and (2) trends in the overall strength of these three social cleavages in each country. Part four discusses the results, and their implications for larger debates.

## 2. Theorizing the changing impact of social cleavages on political behavior

Social cleavages are political differences grounded in the social structure of a society (Barolini and Mair, 1990; Chapter 9). Social structural inequalities give rise to groups of people with shared interests or statuses, and when political party conflict provides an opportunity for their expression, social cleavages are likely to be significant factors shaping the composition and strategies of political parties. For example, if the class profile of social democratic parties or the religious profile of religious parties changes over time, such changes subsequently influence the kinds of issues and positions those parties adopt.

Politically relevant social structural cleavages do change over time. These changes take one of two forms: either change in the partisan alignments of specific groups or change in the relative size of groups. The latter—changes in the relative *size* of groups—has been the subject of some past research on historical trends in US (e.g., Stanley and Niemi, 1993; Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 7) and British party coalitions (Heath et al., 2001, Chapter 7). These are important, especially for assessing the overall impact of cleavages on party strategies and election outcomes. But it is the former set of changes, in the *partisan alignments* of specific groups comprising cleavages, that have been at the center of the vast majority of recent debates. It is to that question that we devote our attention in this paper.

### 2.1. *Conceptualizing the impact of social cleavages*

We define social cleavage impacts in terms of the magnitude of the average difference in political alignment among groups comprising a particular cleavage. The gender cleavage, for instance, is comprised of two groups (women and men), and its magnitude is a function of the extent to which the political alignment (measured by voting or partisanship) of men and women differ. As a consequence of this definition, the size of a cleavage increases when the average difference in vote choice among the social groups comprising that cleavage grows, and decreases as those differences narrow.

### 2.2. *Three social cleavages: an overview*

*Class.* The most vigorous debates about changes in the cleavage structure of advanced capitalist democracies in recent years has concerned class divisions (cf. Manza et al., 1995; Evans, 1999, 2000; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1999). Many analysts have asserted that class divisions are of declining relevance for voting behavior. The arguments in favor of this view are well-known. One line of research emphasizes that the general growth of societal affluence and intergenerational mobility after World War II reduces the pressures that gave rise to cleavage-based voting alignments in the first place (e.g., Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000). In the case of the class cleavage, growing affluence may have provided the working class with a greater material stake in a low-tax and low-spending government (e.g., Clark and Lipset, 1991). Conversely, the rising proportion of middle-class individuals employed by the public sector potentially provides material incentives to support parties of the left (Lamont, 1987). For instance, the increasing salience of a variety of social or “postmaterialist” issues may have encouraged middle class voters to support parties of the left (e.g., Inglehart, 1990, 1997). To the extent that either of these tendencies—working class voters to shift to the right, and/or middle class voters to shift to the left—characterize recent political life in postindustrial democracies, an overall pattern of declining class voting could emerge.

### 2.3. *Religious cleavage*

Although class voting has received the bulk of the attention, religious cleavages have sometimes been viewed as providing the most important social-structural source of voter alignments (e.g. Lijphart, 1979), and scholarly attention to religious-based divides has increased significantly in recent years (see Manza and Wright, 2003). In similar fashion to recent discussions of class voting, however, a general pattern of secularization (especially in the European context) coupled with economic growth and increasing social differentiation is viewed by some analysts as bringing about a reduction in the impact of religious identity on voting behavior (Inglehart, 1990; Wallis and Bruce, 1992; Dogan, 1995). The presumption in most discussions has been that secularization will produce a declining impact of religion on political preference. But this need not necessarily be the case. In countries where

secularization has proceeded furthest, voters who retain their religious identity may oppose other aspects of secularization processes, showing increasing political differences in comparison to non-religious voters. In other words, a shift in the religious cleavage from one based on, for example, Catholic vs. Protestant denominational identities towards one centering on conflicts between secular vs. religious voters may still produce a significant religious cleavage.<sup>3</sup>

#### 2.4. *Gender cleavage*

Systematic comparative research on the impact of gender on political behavior is in an earlier stage of scholarly development (for examples of the few comparative studies, see Norris, 1988; DeVaus and McAllister, 1989; Hayes et al., 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Clear evidence of a growing gender gap in which women voters are more supportive of Left parties than men has been found in countries such as the United States (Mueller, 1988; Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 5) and in the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states (Oskarson, 1992; Velen, 1992). In both of these contexts, employment appears to provide one important source of changing political alignments among women (in relation to men).

Two broad interpretations have emerged in the literature to explain this development: first, women are more likely to be employed in the public sector, and hence more supportive of political parties favoring government employment or growth; and second, working women are more likely than non-working women to rely upon welfare state programs supporting work and childcare. In each case, the argument is that working women have greater incentives to support parties of the left (Andersen, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 2000). However, the evidence for an emerging cross-national gender gap in other countries is uneven. We consider the possibility of a rising gender cleavage, and also the comparative magnitude of gender in relation to the class and religious cleavages.

#### 2.5. *Interrelationships of class, religion, and gender*

Following the logic of our comparative design, there are good reasons to consider the possibility of inter-relationships between social cleavages (e.g., McCall, 2001). For example, declining class divisions may encourage individual voters to distinguish among parties on the basis of other social identities such as religion or gender. Furthermore, the debates and hypotheses relating to social cleavages that we consider in this paper refer to the causal linkage of specific cleavages and political behavior, not to bivariate patterns of association that may overestimate these linkages because of spurious association scenarios. For instance, if a bivariate relationship between religion and voting—or a trend in that relationship—is largely a product of the class composition of religious groups, bivariate estimates that fail to account for class will

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<sup>3</sup> A third type of religious cleavage, between religious liberals and religious conservatives within religious denomination, is sometimes hypothesized as emerging (cf. Wuthnow, 1988). However, we do not have the necessary level of detail in these data to test such propositions.

be biased. Taken together, these considerations suggest the importance of a multi-variate research design that analyzes the net effect of social cleavages on vote choice.

### 3. Data and measures

#### 3.1. Data

To investigate levels of cleavage voting from a historical and comparative perspective, we analyze data from a new dataset, the ISCP file (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom, 2000). The ISCP is a pooled dataset containing information on characteristics of more than 500,000 respondents from over 200 national election and other surveys held in 25 democratic countries in the period 1950–2000.<sup>4</sup> The original survey data were recoded into compatible, standardized measures of key variables for all countries, and then merged into the ISCP file. All data are from nationally representative general population surveys of these countries during the post-World War II period (Appendix A lists the surveys used in this study). For this paper, we selected countries in the ISCP data file with adequately detailed information about class, religion and gender over a suitable historical period:<sup>5</sup> Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. We selected respondents age eighteen years or older for whom we have valid observations about their voting behavior, class, religion and gender. This leaves us with a total of 152,127 respondents: 17,944 in Australia, 5754 in Austria, 39,874 in Germany, 27,758 in Great Britain, 21,008 in The Netherlands, and 39,789 in the US.

#### 3.2. Independent variables

*Class.* While a manual/nonmanual distinction has traditionally been used in research on class voting, recent analysts have sought to apply more detailed class typologies, such as the scheme elaborated by Erikson and Goldthorpe (EG) (1992, Chapter 2). A five-class version of the EG class scheme—which we employ in this study—distinguishes between two white collar classes (a “service class” consisting of professionals and managers and a “routine nonmanual class”), self-employed individuals (including farm owners), and two manual classes (skilled workers and foremen, and non-skilled workers, including farm laborers). This class scheme has proven useful in comparative studies of intergenerational class mobility (Ganzeboom et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992), and in studies examining the relation-

<sup>4</sup> For further details of the individual surveys comprising the ISCP data set, including response rates for particular surveys, see Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom (2000).

<sup>5</sup> The four Scandinavian countries, and also France, Ireland and Italy have no information on respondents’ religion in the original surveys included in the ISCP dataset. For Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland, only data for a limited number of years were available. See Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom (2000) for details. In view of these limitations, these countries were not included in the analyses undertaken in this paper.



ship between social class, social mobility and voting behavior (Heath et al., 1985; Evans et al., 1991; De Graaf et al., 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000). In this paper the class variable also includes a residual sixth class, i.e., a category for non full-time labor force participants.

*Religion.* We divide respondents into three groups: Catholic, Protestant, and no (or other) religion. In some of our countries (e.g., the United States, Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands) there are *both* significant numbers of Catholics and Protestants among the religiously active population. In the other countries, almost all respondents with religious identities are Protestants (Britain, Austria). In some countries such as the United States, divisions *among* Protestants<sup>6</sup> have proven politically significant (e.g., Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Wuthnow and Evans, 2002), but for most of the countries we consider here, the Catholic/Protestant/no religion divide captures the main axis of religious-based differences (and note that in the US, the divide between seculars and those with either Protestant or catholic identity captures one widely debated religious division; see e.g., Hunter, 1991).

*Gender:* Gender is coded as dichotomy (male = 1).

*Period effects:* Electoral eras are clearly important. For example, in several of the countries in our analysis, new Green Parties emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and right-wing parties in the 1990s. Further, the fortunes and composition of both Left and Conservative party families have ebbed and flowed over this period. To capture the effects of electoral period, we include dummy variables for each year data as controls, thereby distinguishing changes affecting all voters from trends affecting the partisan alignments of specific groups comprising the class, religion, and gender cleavages.

### 3.3. *Dependent variables*

Almost all previous comparative cleavage voting studies have been limited to a dichotomous comparison of Left vs. non-Left parties (cf. Franklin et al., 1992). Such an approach is potentially problematic in that most countries have more complex party systems in which three or more parties compete for votes. In order to produce a suitable classification of parties that enables cross-national comparison, we follow the approach of Lane and Ersson (1999) and Lane et al. (1991), identifying six distinct parties or party families. The six party families are: (1) Left parties (i.e., Communist/Socialist/Labor parties), (2) Green parties, (3) Liberal/Centrist parties, (4) Christian-Democratic parties, (5) Conservative parties, and (6) Other parties (including regional and far right-wing parties, etc.). Note that only a subset of these party families tend to receive significant numbers of votes in a given political system, so in

<sup>6</sup> While the requirements of cross-nationally standardizeable religion data impose limits on any finer-grained measurement of religion in the current analyses, we do not rule out the possibility that research with a more limited cross-national scope may be able to carve out such distinctions. But we also note that past research on the US (the country with a great level of within-Protestant complexity) provides evidence that trends and main effect estimates of religious differences (including within-Protestant differences) are generally independent of class and gender effects on vote choice (Brooks and Manza, 1997).



practice we focus on the most meaningful categories found within each polity (for further details, see [Appendix B](#)).

In this scheme, Left parties (whether of communist or social-democratic heritage) are treated as homogenous, while Green parties are treated as a distinct left-liberal bloc in those countries where they receive enough support to permit meaningful analysis (cf. [Redding and Viterna, 1999](#)). Important distinctions should also be made between center or liberal parties and traditional conservative parties. We identify liberal parties on the basis of ideology and international co-operation in the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community. The prototypes of the modern conservative party are to be found in Great Britain, the United States, and in Scandinavia, where those parties adhere to free-market ideological traditions placing them on the right of the party system. Religious parties trace their origins to formal ties with religious denominations, often reflected in their names. In the Other parties category a mixture of ultra-right, ethnic and protest parties are included. Ultra-right parties have sometimes been formed on the basis of specific issues, to channel voter discontent, and sometimes can trace their roots to the Fascist parties of the inter-war period. In [Appendix B](#) we list the parties comprising each party family.

#### 4. Statistical models and cleavage voting indices

The measurement of cleavage voting within a country at a given point in time is critical to research on social cleavages and political behavior. Traditionally, simple bivariate measures using dichotomous variables (such as the Alford index for class voting) have been used ([Alford, 1963](#)). But such measures have significant flaws that can generate misleading conclusions (e.g., [Korpi, 1972](#)). Recently, more adequate ways to examine the relationship between cleavages and voting have been developed. First, multivariate models that enable measurement of political changes affecting *specific* cleavages vs. changes affecting *all* cleavages equally are now commonplace. Second, recent scholarship has sought to avoid arbitrary or unrealistic assumptions about interval-level measurement in party choice by using log-linear or logistic regression models that are appropriate for analyzing nominal dependent variables (see e.g., [Heath et al. \(1985\)](#) and [Manza et al. \(1995\)](#) for overviews).

In this paper, we analyze social cleavages using multinomial logistic regression (MLR) models of party choice ([Hout, Brooks, and Manza, 1995](#); [Brooks, 2000](#); [Gerber, 2000](#)). In our models, the dependent variable is the log of the odds of choosing a specific party family over the reference party family for person  $i$ . We evaluate four types of MLR models, each embedding different theoretical assumptions about political changes affecting cleavages or specific groups of voters. The *base* model assumes no change in the effects of cleavages over time, and it is represented in Eq. (1):

$$\Phi_{ij} = \alpha_j + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_{pj} D_{ip} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{qj} C_{iq} + \sum_{r=1}^R \beta_{rj} G_{ir} + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta_{sj} F_{is}, \quad (1)$$

where  $D_{ip}$  are dummy variables for survey year;  $C_{iq}$  are dummy variables for class category;  $G_{ir}$  are dummy variables for religion categories; and  $F_{is}$  is a dummy variable for gender. The parameters to be estimated in this model are the constants,  $\alpha_j$ , and the  $\beta$ -parameters for the main effects of year ( $\beta_{pj}$ ), class ( $\beta_{qj}$ ), religion ( $\beta_{rj}$ ), and gender ( $\beta_{sj}$ ) on party family choice  $j$ .<sup>7</sup> Using this base model, we can systematically evaluate the evidence for trends in the political effects of cleavages using four different parameterizations of change.

Our second model is motivated by the widely debated hypothesis of cleavage decline discussed earlier in the paper, namely, that the class and religious cleavages have a declining impact on voter alignments in Western democracies. We call this the *traditional decline* model. It parameterizes changes in voter alignments by focusing on the key social groups that are hypothesized as changing their partisan orientations. Regarding change in the political-behavioral effects of class, the traditional decline hypothesis is that left vs. right conflict exemplified in the partisan alignments of manual workers and the service class (the polar classes in capitalist societies) will become more similar over time. This model thus adds to model 1 two additional coefficients: one coefficient is for a linearly constrained change in support for Left vs. Right party families (Liberal vs. Left in Australia, Liberal vs. Conservative in the US, Conservative vs. Left in Britain, and Left vs. Religious in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands) among unskilled/skilled workers (treating the latter as a single homogenous category); and a second coefficient for linear change in support for these parties among the service class.<sup>8</sup>

For cleavage variables that are treated as dichotomies in the traditional decline analysis (e.g., religious vs. non-religious; men vs. women), model identification requires that we parameterize only one group-specific shift in partisan alignment, where the other group is treated as the reference. Traditional decline in the religious cleavage is parameterized using a single coefficient for linearly constrained change in the alignment of religious voters (Protestant or Catholic) with Left vs. Religious/Conservative/Liberal party families.<sup>9</sup> Traditional decline in the gender cleavage is measured with a coefficient for linearly constrained change in the alignments of men with Left vs. Religious/Conservative/Liberal party families.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> To identify the model we constrain parameters for one level of each cleavage variable to 0, and setting one level of the party family choice variable as the reference category.

<sup>8</sup> In countries in which Religious party families obtain a larger portion of the vote than Liberal parties (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands), we specify the latter as the reference, assuming that support for the latter better measures the underlying dimension of left vs. right partisan political conflict.

<sup>9</sup> In countries with Religious party families (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands), we specify the latter as the reference in estimating the log-odds of support for Left party families vs. Religious party families; in countries without Religious party families, we specify as the reference Liberal (Australia) or Conservative party families (Britain, the US) to estimate the log-odds of support for Left party families (the democratic party in the US).

<sup>10</sup> In Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, the equation measuring traditional decline in the gender cleavage is for the log-odds of favoring Left vs. Religious party families; in Britain and the US, the corresponding log-odds contrast is for favoring Left (Liberal in the US) over Conservative party families; and in Australia the relevant log-odds contrast is for favoring Left over Liberal party families.

Using as an example the class cleavage, this *traditional decline* model is summarized below:

$$\Phi_{ij} = \alpha_j + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_{pj} D_{ip} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{qj} C_{iq} + \sum_{r=1}^R \beta_{rj} G_{ir} + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta_{sj} F_{is} + \phi_{41} C_{i4} Y_{i0} + \phi_{11} H_{i1} Y_{i0}. \quad (2)$$

The traditional decline model in Eq. (2) is distinguished from the base model in Eq. (1) by having two additional  $\phi$ -coefficients for changes in the respective alignments of the service class and unskilled/skilled workers with Left party families ( $j = 1$ ). For both coefficients, the linear trend constraint is imposed by computing the product of the relevant dummy variable for group membership by a continuous variable for time ( $Y_0$ ) in which survey years are represented by fixed scores.

The traditional decline model imposes restrictions that may not adequately capture changes affecting the three cleavages in our analyses: changing alignments of key groups are assumed *not* to affect choices involving Other party families; and changes in the alignments of groups comprising cleavages are limited to the pairs of groups discussed above. If these assumptions are unrealistic, then our third model, the *linear change model*, will be preferred over the traditional decline model developed in Eq. (2). Using as an example the class cleavage, this *linear change* model can be summarized as follows:

$$\Phi_{ij} = \alpha_j + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_{pj} D_{ip} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{qj} C_{iq} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \phi_{qj} C_{iq} Y_{i0} + \sum_{r=1}^R \beta_{rj} G_{ir} + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta_{sj} F_{is}. \quad (3)$$

In contrast to both the base and traditional decline models, the linear change model in Eq. (3) is distinguished by having  $Q$   $\phi$ -coefficients capturing changes in the partisan political alignments of *each* category comprising the class cleavage. As before, the fixed score for year constrains over-time change in class-specific alignments to follow a linear pattern. However, because the linear change model does not restrict political-behavioral change to the specific social groups specified by the traditional decline models, the linear change model consumes more degrees of freedom. In the analyses below, we estimate linear change models that parameterize changes affecting the (non-redundant) groups comprising the three cleavages.

The possibility that changes in voter alignments within specific countries may be more complicated than that specified by either the linear change or traditional decline model raises yet another set of complications. For example, if changes in the class cleavage variable involves only the self-employed and unskilled workers, or if such patterns of change vary systematically across country context (e.g., if class cleavage change in the US involves the service class while class cleavage change in Austria involves the self-employed and routine white-collar employees). These possibilities are embedded in a fourth model we consider in the paper, what we call the *intermediate linear* model. This model constrains linear parameter change coefficients for specific social groups to 0, while restricting the  $\phi$ -coefficients for some groups to pertain to particular party families, thereby evaluating hypotheses about the party-

specific aspects of cleavage change.<sup>11</sup> By virtue of these flexible constraints, the intermediate model provides parsimonious specifications of cleavage change, and in the analyses below, we estimate the best-fitting such model for each of the six countries, developing comparisons with our competing models of cleavage change and with the base model.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, we consider a model which imposes no constraints on the structure of the relationship between a specific cleavage, time, and party family choice. Using the class cleavage as an example, this yields the *unconstrained change* model,

$$\Phi_{ij} = \alpha_j + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_{pj} D_{ip} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{qj} C_{iq} + \sum_{p=1}^P \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{pqj} D_{ip} C_{iq} + \sum_{r=1}^R \beta_{rj} G_{ir} + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta_{sj} F_{is}, \quad (4)$$

where the  $\beta_{pqj}$  are the year-specific parameters for the  $q$ th class and the  $j$ th party family. Because this unconstrained model parameterizes *all* possible permutations of change affecting cleavages, it enables informative comparisons with more parsimonious specifications of those changes.

In evaluating both global and specific hypotheses about over-time changes in the magnitude of social cleavages, our goal is to select a preferred model that fits the data better than alternative specifications. In addition to reporting the usual  $-2\log$ -likelihood statistic, we use Raftery's (1995) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to arrive at a preferred model of social cleavages within specific countries.<sup>13</sup> Given the existence of our multiple and competing models of cleavage change, and also the large sample involved in the six countries in our analyses, BIC provides a useful guide because it directly takes into account both model structure and sample size in evaluating fit. If we ignore such information and rely solely on the  $\chi^2$  test to minimize deviance, the tendency is to reject reasonable models in favor of artificially-complicated models that over-fit the data, potentially leading to biased inferences.<sup>14</sup> We discuss additional details of model selection in the results section.

<sup>11</sup> If (and only if) the  $\phi$ -coefficients are identical to the constraints employed by the traditional decline model will the latter be identical with the intermediate model.

<sup>12</sup> There are, in principle, a very large number of intermediate models that could be estimated for a given country. As a result, our consideration of these models is guided by three general criteria that seek to avoid excessively inductive model searches: First, we focus our hypothesis testing on coefficients that represent the most plausible types of change considered in the literature on social cleavages; second, we use estimates from the linear change model to screen for patterns of significant (and non-significant results) in the political-behavioral effects of specific group memberships; and third, we use iterative procedures to evaluate reduced-form vs. elaborated extensions of these models, comparing their respective fits to data.

<sup>13</sup> For multinomial logistic regression models, BIC is computed as  $-2\log$ -likelihood  $-(df) \times (\ln N)$ , where  $df$  is the degrees of freedom remaining after estimating the model,  $\ln$  is the natural logarithm, and  $N$  is the sample size.

<sup>14</sup> A Monte Carlo study by Wong (1994) using log-linear association models found that whereas measures of fit based on the  $\chi^2$  test were biased toward models that included unnecessary (and thus misleading) parameters, BIC consistently performed better than these and other measures of model fit. Our large-sample analyses of party choice is similar in structure to the adjacent field of comparative mobility research, in which analysts are increasingly aware of the risks of over-fitting large datasets and find BIC useful in avoiding Type 1 statistical errors (Hauser, 1995). See Raftery (1995) for discussion and additional Monte Carlo results.

#### 4.1. Cleavage voting indices

Using the coefficients of our preferred model of party choice for each of the six countries, we constructed measures of the magnitude of a cleavage within a particular polity during a specific time period. Building from recent advances in the measurement of cleavages (e.g., Hout et al., 1995), we define cleavage voting as the average deviation in party choice for a specific group comprising a cleavage from the average party choice for all groups comprising a cleavage. This standard deviation-based measure has a number of desirable properties. First, the measure enables direct comparison of the magnitude of cleavages across countries, even when different (numbers or types of) political parties are involved. Second, the measure can be calculated for specific cleavages holding constants the effects of other cleavages, thereby permitting direct comparisons of cleavages' respective magnitudes. Third, the index can be calculated for models employing additional controls.

Following the notation of Hout et al. (1995), we refer to this measure as  $\kappa$ . It is calculated as the standard deviation of the predicted probability of party family choice  $j$  for groups  $g$  comprising a given cleavage at time  $t$ , yielding the following equation:

$$\kappa_t = \left[ \frac{1}{GJ} \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{g=1}^G (\hat{P}_{tjg} - \bar{P}_{tj})^2 \right]^{1/2}. \quad (5)$$

In Eq. (5),  $\bar{P}_{tj}$  is the mean vote choice for the groups comprising a cleavage, and by virtue of the probability metric,  $\kappa$  ranges between 0 and .5, with a score of “0” for a given cleavage indicating that the groups comprising the cleavage variable do not differ in their likelihood of preferring a particular party family, while a score of “.5” indicates maximal divergence in partisan alignment. Once we have obtained our estimates of the magnitude of social cleavages, we use graphical displays to summarize over-time patterns of change affecting specific cleavages in each of the six countries in the analyses.

In addition to estimating changing magnitudes of specific cleavages over time, we also seek to analyze the *overall* magnitude of all cleavages within a particular country at a given point in time. Our measure of overall cleavage voting is lambda ( $\lambda$ ),<sup>15</sup> which we calculate as the mean of the three separate kappas measuring class, religion, and gender cleavages within a specific country and time. In the following equation, there are  $H$  cleavages ( $h = 1$  for the class cleavage, 2 for the religion cleavage, and 3 for the gender cleavage), so

$$\lambda_t = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^H \kappa_{th}}{H}. \quad (6)$$

$\lambda_t$  indicates the average size of a cleavage at time  $t$ , and a  $\lambda$  index score of .1 thus indicates that the difference between the partisan choice of a given group comprising a social cleavage and the overall mean for all cleavages is 10%. Put another way,  $\lambda = .1$  implies that the average expected political difference between any two groups

<sup>15</sup> See Brooks and Manza (1997) for application of this measure to the study of US political change.

comprising the class, religion, and gender cleavages is 20%. In similar fashion to our  $\kappa$  estimates, we graph  $\lambda$  index scores by time and country to detect historical and cross-national trends in the postwar development of social cleavages.

## 5. Results

### 5.1. Evaluating competing models of cleavage change

We begin by selecting a preferred model of the over-time pattern of cleavage voting for each of the six countries in our analysis. Table 1 presents fit statistics for evaluating competing models for our first three countries, Australia, Austria, and Britain. For Australia, neither the traditional decline, linear change, nor full interaction models of class cleavage change improves over the fit of the base model. The decision rule of choosing the model with the lowest BIC index value reveals that the intermediate model improves the fit of the base model by adding a single coefficient for change in the log-odds of favoring Other vs. Left parties among the self-employed.<sup>16</sup> Regarding the religion and gender cleavages in Australia, BIC rejects all cleavage change models in favor of the base model that assumes *no* trends in the partisan political effects of religion and gender. The preferred model of social cleavages in Australia thus includes only a single parameter change coefficient.<sup>17</sup>

For Austria, neither the linear change, traditional decline, nor full interaction models improves the fit of the base model, and the difference between the BIC index score for the base model and its closest competitor is 8, representing strong evidence for preferring the base model. Given that we were also unable to find any intermediate specifications that yield evidence of change in the political effects of class, religion, and gender, our preferred model for Austria is the base model.

Our results for Britain provide evidence of significant political changes affecting the class cleavage. More specifically, while the traditional decline, linear change, and full interaction models are rejected in favor of the base model, the intermediate model improves over the fit of the latter by parameterizing three instances of change in class-based voter alignments (involving unskilled workers, routine nonmanual workers, and the self-employed with respect to the log-odds of favoring Conservative over Labour parties). Regarding the religion and gender cleavages, our results find the base

<sup>16</sup> As an example of calculating BIC, the BIC index value for the base model for Australia is calculated as  $-147,565 = 27,824.72 - (17,906 \times 9.795)$ .

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix C for coefficient estimates for this model (and Appendices D,E,F,G,H for corresponding coefficients of preferred models for the other countries). Note that coefficients measuring group-based differences for logit contrasts involving party families receiving very *small* fractions of the vote choice can predictably be quite large. While the coefficients can themselves be normalized and used to derive the  $\kappa$  index scores, it is preferable in the current application to multi-party systems to instead use the predicted *probabilities* since unlike the logistic scale these have upper and lower bounds, thereby delivering more meaningful estimates of group-based differences in political alignments with respect to minor party families (e.g., using a baseline of  $-3.00$ , a logit coefficient of  $-10.00$  translates into a more modest difference in predicted probability of approximately .05).

Table 1

Fit statistics for multinomial logistic regression models (preferred in bold) of social cleavages and vote choice in Australia,<sup>a</sup> Austria,<sup>b</sup> and Britain<sup>c</sup>

	–2LL (df)/BIC Australia (N = 17,944)	–2LL (df)/BIC Austria (N = 5754)	–2LL (df)/BIC Britain (N = 27,758)
<b>Base model</b>			
Main effects	27,824.72 (17,906)/ –147,565	<b>11,266.12 (5,709)/</b> <b>–38,160</b>	59,451.82 (27,683)/ –223,781
<b>Class</b>			
Traditional decline	27,821.26 (17,904)/ –147,549	11,262.42 (5,707)/ –38,147	59,436.20 (27,681)/ –223,776
Linear change	27,794.10 (17,896)/ –147,497	11,235.22 (5,694)/ –38,061	59,382.24 (27,668)/ –223,697
Intermediate	27,810.06 (17,905)/ –145,586	– –	59,414.94 (27,680)/ –223,787
Full interaction	27,673.30 (17,806)/ –146,737	11,133.06 (5,619)/ –37,514	59,059.90 (27,443)/ –221,717
<b>Religion</b>			
Traditional decline	27,817.10 (17,905)/ –147,563	11,266.02 (5,708)/ –38,152	59,451.02 (27,682)/ –223,771
Linear change	27,815.14 (17,902)/ –147,535	11,255.82 (5,703)/ –38,119	59,446.40 (27,677)/ –223,725
Intermediate	– –	– –	– –
Full interaction	27,761.26 (17,866)/ –147,236	11,206.20 (5,673)/ –37,909	59,309.76 (27,587)/ –222,941
<b>Gender</b>			
Traditional decline	27,822.84 (17,905)/ –147,557	11,266.06 (5,708)/ –38,152	59,450.56 (27,682)/ –223,772
Linear change	27,822.70 (17,904)/ –147,547	11,264.86 (5,706)/ –38,136	59,440.94 (27,680)/ –223,761
Intermediate	– –	– –	– –
Full interaction	27,804.40 (17,850)/ –147,037	11,244.14 (5,691)/ –38,027	59,309.76 (27,587)/ –222,941
<b>All cleavages</b>			
Linear change	27,782.42 (17,890)/ –147,450	11,225.20 (5,685)/ –37,994	59,367.52 (27,659)/ –223,619
Intermediate	<b>27,810.06 (17,905)/</b> <b>–145,586</b>	– –	<b>59,414.94 (27,680)/</b> <b>–223,787</b>
Full interaction	27,593.36 (17,746)/ –146,229	11,051.14 (5,565)/ –37,129	58,847.14 (27,299)/ –220,457

<sup>a</sup> Australia: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has a single additional coefficient for a linearly constrained interaction between self-employed and year for the log-odds of favoring Other over Left parties; there are no viable intermediate models for religion or gender cleavages (– is thus printed).

<sup>b</sup> Austria: There are no viable intermediate models for the class, religion, or religion or gender cleavages (– is thus printed).

<sup>c</sup> Britain: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has three additional coefficients for the linearly constrained interactions between unskilled workers and year, routine nonmanual workers and year, and self-employed and year—all predicting the log-odds of favoring Conservative over Left parties; there are no viable intermediate models for either the religion or gender cleavages (– is thus printed).



model is preferred over all alternatives by a large margin, leaving our earlier class cleavage change model as our preferred specification of social cleavage voting in Britain.

In Table 2, we present results for the other three countries: Germany, the Netherlands and the US. The German results show that while the traditional decline model of the class cleavage is preferred over the base model, the intermediate class model improves the fit of both (linear change and full interaction models are easily rejected). The intermediate model differs from traditional decline by having separate coefficients (rather than a single homogenous coefficient) for changes in the log-odds of favoring Left over Religious party families among unskilled and skilled workers, and also a third coefficient for the linearly constrained interaction between service class and year for the log-odds of favoring Green over Religious party families. For the religion

Table 2

Fit statistics for multinomial logistic regression models (preferred in bold) of social cleavages and vote choice in Germany<sup>a</sup>, the Netherlands,<sup>b</sup> and the US<sup>c</sup>

	<i>-2LL (df)/BIC</i> Germany ( <i>N</i> = 39,874)	<i>-2LL (df)/BIC</i> Netherlands ( <i>N</i> =21,008)	<i>-2LL (df)/BIC</i> US ( <i>N</i> = 39,789)
<b>Base model</b>			
Main effects	88,023.94 (39,770)/ -333,279	44,043.08 (20,939)/ -164,356	65,590.52 (39,721)/ -355,108
<b>Class</b>			
Traditional decline	87,981.06 (39,768)/ -333,300	44,018.82 (20,937)/ -164,360	65,565.10 (39,719)/ -355,113
Linear change	87,928.68 (39,750)/ -333,162	43,968.48 (20,924)/ -164,281	65,525.16 (39,711)/ -355,068
Intermediate	87,967.50 (39,767)/ -333,303	43,985.12 (20,936)/ -164,384	65,562.98 (39,719)/ -355,115
Full interaction	87,576.22 (39,430)/ -330,125	43,698.28 (20,729)/ -162,610	65,108.38 (39,471)/ -352,943
<b>Religion</b>			
Traditional decline	88,014.14 (39,769)/ -333,278	44,010.86 (20,938)/ -164,378	65,584.34 (39,720)/ -355,104
Linear change	87,891.28 (39,762)/ -333,327	43,913.22 (20,933)/ -164,426	65,565.28 (39,717)/ -355,091
Intermediate	—	—	65,568.48 (39,720)/ -355,120
Full interaction	87,724.24 (39,634)/ -332,138	43,727.52 (20,855)/ -163,835	65,274.40 (39,621)/ -354,365
<b>Gender</b>			
Traditional decline	88,008.72 (39,769)/ -333,283	44,019.84 (20,938)/ -164,369	65,555.28 (39,720)/ -355,133
Linear change	87,999.08 (39,766)/ -333,261	44,011.66 (20,936)/ -164,357	65,555.28 (39,719)/ -355,122
Intermediate	88,008.72 (39,769)/ -333,283	44,019.84 (20,938)/ -164,369	65,555.28 (39,720)/ -355,133
Full interaction	87,920.30 (39,702)/ -332,662	43,942.30 (20,897)/ -164,038	65,471.26 (39,671)/ -354,698

(continued on next page)

Table 2 (continued)

	–2LL (df)/BIC Germany (N = 39,874)	–2LL (df)/BIC Netherlands (N=21,008)	–2LL (df)/BIC US (N = 39,789)
<b>All cleavages</b>			
Linear change	87,759.90 (39,738)/ –333,204	43,816.36 (20,915)/ –164,343	65,481.78 (39,705)/ –355,048
Intermediate	<b>87,967.50 (39,767)/</b> <b>–333,303</b>	<b>43,843.64 (20,929)/</b> <b>–164,456</b>	<b>65,519.74 (39,717)/</b> <b>–355,137</b>
Full interaction	87,161.14 (39,226)/ –328,379	43,305.44 (20,603)/ –161,749	64,695.12 (39,321)/ –351,767

<sup>a</sup> Germany: The intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coefficients for the linearly constrained interaction between skilled and year (and between unskilled workers and year) for the log-odds of favoring Left over Religious parties, and a third additional coefficient for the linearly constrained interaction between service class and year for the log-odds of favoring Green over Religious party families. No viable intermediate model for the religion cleavage (\_\_\_ is thus printed); intermediate model for gender is the traditional decline model, with a single coefficient for a linearly constrained interaction between men and year for the log-odds of favoring Left over Religious parties. Note that because inclusion of the additional coefficient from the intermediate gender model yields a worse fit (BIC = –333,297) over the intermediate class model, the intermediate model for all cleavages is the intermediate class model.

<sup>b</sup> Netherlands: Intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coefficients for linearly constrained interactions between unskilled and year (and skilled workers and year) for the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Religious parties, and a final linearly constrained interaction between self-employed and year for the log-odds of favoring Other over Religious parties; the preferred model for religion is the linear change model; intermediate model for gender is the traditional decline model, with a single coefficient for a linearly constrained interaction between men and year for the log-odds of favoring Left over Religious parties.

<sup>c</sup> US: Intermediate model for the class cleavage has two additional coefficients for linearly constrained interactions between unskilled workers or skilled workers and year for the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties; intermediate model for religion cleavage has a single additional coefficient for interaction of Catholics and year for log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties; intermediate model for gender is the traditional decline mode, with a single additional coefficient for the interaction of gender and year for the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties.

cleavage, BIC selects the base model over traditional decline, linear change, and full interaction models. While the margin of improvement over the first two of these models is not large (–1 and –2, respectively), we were unable to find a satisfactory intermediate model, and thus retain the base model of the religious cleavage. For gender, the traditional decline model is preferred over alternatives, but additional analyses provide little evidence for gender-specific change in voter alignments,<sup>18</sup> and we thus select the intermediate class cleavage model as the preferred model for Germany.

<sup>18</sup> The fit of the intermediate model of group-specific changes affecting all three cleavages worsens considerably in comparison to the fit of the intermediate class model when we estimate the single additional gender cleavage change coefficient (BIC for this model is –333,297, in comparison to the –333,303 BIC score for the intermediate class model). This result suggests that the apparent shift in Left party alignment among male voters is largely a function of underlying political changes affecting (disproportionately male) skilled and unskilled German workers. Providing some corroboration for this inference, the logistic regression coefficient for gender-specific change in male voter alignments shrinks by approximately 50% from an initial value of –.011 when the three class cleavage change parameters are estimated in the same model.

For the Netherlands, the traditional decline model improves the fit of the base, but the intermediate model is easily preferred over all alternative models, providing evidence for significant changes affecting the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Religious parties among skilled and unskilled workers (and also significant change in the log-odds of favoring Other over Religious parties among the self-employed). For the religion cleavage, the traditional decline model improves over the base model, but the fit of the linear change model is superior, making linear change the preferred model of religion. The situation is reversed for the gender cleavage, with traditional decline being preferred over the base, linear change, and the full interaction models. Our preferred model of social cleavage voting in the Netherlands includes change parameters from the three preceding models.

For the US class cleavage, the intermediate model improves over all alternatives by restricting class-specific changes in alignments to a pair of changes in the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative (i.e., Democratic over Republican) parties among unskilled and skilled workers. For religion, the base model is preferred over traditional decline, linear change, and full interaction models, but adding a single coefficient for change in the log-odds of favoring Liberal over Conservative parties among Catholics yields a preferred intermediate model of religion. While the linear change and traditional decline models of gender improve the fit of base and full interaction models, traditional decline is preferred over linear change, and the preferred model of social cleavages in the US thus includes the four cleavage change coefficients of preceding models.

## 5.2. *Class vs. religious vs. gender voting*

Using the preferred models in [Tables 1 and 2](#), we can now estimate the changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages within each country (see [Appendices C,D,E,F,G,H](#) for coefficient estimates). [Fig. 1](#) presents  $\kappa$  index scores for each cleavage, country and year in the analyses.<sup>19</sup> Our graphical displays enable direct comparisons between countries and over time, with upward-sloping estimates indicating an increase in the magnitude of a particular cleavage, and downward-sloping estimates indicating a decrease in magnitude.

Which social cleavage is most important for voter alignments within these capitalist democracies? Our results are in line with the expectations of most—but not all—earlier research, with class being the largest cleavage within most countries. The average  $\kappa$  index score for the class cleavage (.060), however, is only slightly larger than the corresponding score for the religious cleavage (.058), indicating that we can expect the average difference in party family choice for two class categories to

<sup>19</sup> We use male Protestant respondents who are in the service class as the baseline for our calculations of group-specific probabilities, thereby selecting the modal groups in our analysis of the three cleavage variables. As discussed earlier, we use the coefficient of our preferred models to calculate the relevant group-specific probability for each year, party family, and country; the standard deviation of the probabilities for groups comprising a specific cleavage thus becomes the subsequent  $\kappa$  score.




Fig. 1. Changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages.

be approximately 12%. Although class is typically the largest social cleavage, religion has larger political effects in both the Netherlands and the US (despite an overall decline in the religion cleavage in the Netherlands). Regarding gender, this cleavage is virtually non-existent in four of our six countries, with evidence of a small, emerging cleavage in the Netherlands since 1990, and evidence of a larger cleavage in the US that has been growing steadily during the past three decades.

### 5.3. Class voting

Regarding the class cleavage, our analyses reveal the existence of some important and hitherto undiscovered trends amidst a background of significant cross-national differences. While Australia and the Netherlands have experienced over-time variation, the class cleavage within these two countries shows only little indication of any net decrease in magnitude. Class has only marginally smaller effect on voter alignments in the 1990s as in the 1980s (or the 1970s, using the longer-running series available for the Netherlands). In Austria, estimates for class voting show less variation over-time and little evidence of a net increase or decrease.

By contrast, our results suggest a *decreasing* importance of class in Britain, and to a lesser extent in Germany. Declines in the political effects of class in Britain represent long-term trends in which there was a sharp decline from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, followed by stable levels of class voting that did *not* return to the earlier, higher levels of the 1970s.<sup>20</sup> Although considerably smaller in magnitude, a pattern of decline is also observable in Germany, with the magnitude of the class cleavage tending to be lower at each subsequent election. The US has the lowest levels of class voting of the six countries in our analysis, and shows no evidence of a net increase or decrease.<sup>21</sup>

Given the centrality of debates about the political direction of the working class in the overall debates about class voting trends, we examine in greater detail changes affecting the partisan political alignments of unskilled workers. Since our earlier results provide evidence that class cleavage changes are concentrated along the dimension of support for Left parties, we present in Fig. 2 estimates that provide further information about unskilled workers' alignment with Left Party families.<sup>22</sup> The estimates graphed in each of Fig. 2's six charts show the predicted *difference* in the probability of supporting Left party families among unskilled workers vs. the average class voter (i.e. the average for the six classes). These estimates are thus derived from subtracting the probability of an unskilled worker supporting a Left party family from the probability of any voter supporting a left party family. Upwards-sloping estimates suggest growing differences in unskilled

<sup>20</sup> These results for the British class cleavage appear to diverge from earlier findings presented by Heath et al. (1991) and Goldthorpe (1998). Although they use a different class scheme from these other researchers, Weakliem and Heath's (1999) analysis of election data from the 1930s suggests that British class voting was at its highest point in 1960 (and preceded by lower levels in the 1930s and 1940s), thereby providing a potential means of reconciling the preceding findings.

<sup>21</sup> These results contrast with recent findings of a *decline* in the magnitude of the American class cleavage since 1980 (Manza and Brooks, 1999, Chapter 8). Because the current results are based on different data for elections since 1972, these differences cannot be easily resolved. While this issue merits further investigation, it has little effect on our inferences regarding cleavages within the other five countries.

<sup>22</sup> Note that to accommodate the larger variability in predicted scores for Fig. 2 we have employed a wider range of values on the Y-axes of individual charts. This contrasts with the narrower range chosen for the Y-axes of Fig. 1 (and Fig. 3's charts), so comparisons across these two sets of figures should take into account this variation in graphical presentation.




Fig. 2. Changing in the political alignments of unskilled workers.

workers' alignment with Left parties, whereas downward-sloping estimates suggest growing similarity between the alignments of unskilled workers vs. the typical class category.

The estimates for Britain and Germany show that unskilled workers' declining attachments to Left parties have emerged in tandem with overall declines in the magnitude of the class cleavage within these two countries. Indeed, the large magnitude of unskilled workers' political trends is such that without these political changes, the British and German class cleavages would have experienced considerably more modest changes over time.

By contrast, Australia has experienced no change in the relative alignment of unskilled workers with Left parties; Austria also shows little net change. While the *overall* class cleavage in the Netherlands and the US shows little evidence of net change (see Fig. 1), the relative alignments of unskilled workers have declined in both countries. These changes have been more extensive in the US, and the negative values suggest that unskilled workers have supported Left party candidates at *lower* levels than the average class voter in recent American elections.

#### 5.4. Religious voting

The second largest social cleavage is for religion (and at least with respect to most of these countries, claims that the religious cleavage has greater impact than class is not supported). Returning to Fig. 1, our results provide clear evidence of decline in a single country (the Netherlands), and this pattern has followed a cyclical rather than strictly linear pattern. A second country, Austria, is suggestive of a decline in the religious cleavage, but further examination casts some doubt on this interpretation.<sup>23</sup> A third country, Australia, is initially suggestive of an *increase* in the religious cleavage, but similar considerations cast doubt on this interpretation.<sup>24</sup>

The three remaining countries in the analysis show less over-time variability in levels of religious voting and little evidence of monotonic patterns involving trends.<sup>25</sup> The apparent stability of the religious cleavage within these countries is noteworthy in light of significant changes affecting the magnitude of the class cleavage in both Britain and Germany, and changes affecting the gender cleavage in the U.S. Also of note, the average size of the religious cleavage is similar in these otherwise different polities, centering around a value of approximately .046.

<sup>23</sup> More specifically, our preferred model of cleavage voting in Austria contains no coefficients for change in the partisan alignments of religious groups. As a result, the over-time decrease in religious voting is largely generated by the most recent election in our series (1995), in which the disproportionate increase in the tendency of *all* voters to support the Liberal party family sharply reduced the probability of any social group supporting the Religious party family. The subsequent compression in probabilities disproportionately affects the three religious groups in our analysis, reducing the standard deviation of their estimated probabilities (and thus the  $\kappa$  index score for the religious cleavage).

<sup>24</sup> That a significant religion-related cleavage exist in West European countries may appear initially surprising, given greater tendencies toward secularization on the European continent. European secularization may act so as to simply swell the ranks of respondents with no religion, or, alternatively, also be insufficient to comprehensively lessen the partisan salience of Protestant vs. Catholic vs. no religion differences at the ballot box. Given our findings, further research may profit by examining in greater detail further causal foundations of religious voting within countries with significant religious cleavages.

<sup>25</sup> In similar fashion to the case of Austria, our preferred model of social cleavages in Australia has no coefficient for parameter change affecting the religious cleavage. Detailed investigation reveals that the first three elections of the Australian series were characterized by unusually high levels of Social Democratic party family support that compressed partisan political differences between Catholics/non-religious voters vs. Protestants (i.e., during later elections characterized by *lower* levels of Social Democratic support).



### 5.5. Gender voting

The expectation of most sociological commentary on the gender cleavage is that women are more likely to support Left parties than men, and that gender has become more important over time. But with the exception of the US, our results from these six countries provide little evidence for the growing partisan importance of gender. Only two of the six countries have statistically significant regression coefficients for the effect of gender on Left party choice, and in one of these (the Netherlands), women are less left-wing than men. Moreover, as presented in Fig. 1, the differences in predicted probabilities for women vs. men voters are generally minuscule and only the US gender cleavage conforms to the expectation of a linearly evolving trend. While these findings suggest that it may be premature to expect gender to emerge as a factor comparable to class or religion, it will be important to test these findings in other contexts (particularly the Scandinavian countries), where gender differences are often thought to be more extensive (cf. Oskarson, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 2000).

### 5.6. Overall cleavage voting

What implications do these analyses have for understanding the cross-national magnitude and historical trends in *overall* levels of cleavage voting within capitalist democracies? We answer these questions using the  $\lambda$  index which measures the average level of social cleavage voting for particular time periods within each country. The results of these analyses are presented in Fig. 3.

These results provide no evidence for the existence of a universal decline in social cleavage voting during the past three decades, as a number of analysts have suggested. Patterns of cleavage change tend to instead be specific to countries, with two countries experiencing net increases in social cleavages (Australia and the US), three countries experiencing an overall decline (Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands), and the remaining country experiencing over-time patterns that do not suggest trends (Austria<sup>26</sup>). The two countries characterized by increasing trends have moved from having the lowest levels of social cleavage voting to positions closer to the average levels of the other countries. In Australia, the overall social cleavage grew from .027 in 1979 to .034 in 1998. In the US, the average social cleavage increased from .025 in 1964 to .039 in 1998.

The cases of Britain and Germany (and to a somewhat lesser extent the Netherlands) illustrate the declining cleavage scenario. The overall level of cleavage voting declined substantially from .046 to .035 in Britain (and from .056 to .047 in the Netherlands), while declining by a more modest 10% in Germany (from .040 to .036). These declines reveal the importance of declining trends in class voting within

<sup>26</sup> This decrease in overall social cleavage voting is produced by a single recent election (1995), and as discussed earlier, there are compelling reasons to interpret cleavage voting in Austria as instead reflecting a pattern of overall stability.




Fig. 3. Changing magnitude of the overall social cleavage.

Britain and Germany: net of class cleavage change, overall cleavage voting has changed little in Britain (*increasing* .01 from 1966 to 1997), and remained stable in Germany. The case of the Netherlands is slightly more complicated, insofar as the class cleavage has fluctuated in a non-monotonic fashion and the religion cleavage has declined substantially (but in a non-linear fashion), while the emergence of a small gender gap reduced what would otherwise have been a larger decline in overall cleavage voting.

Taken as a whole, a further notable result is the perhaps surprising degree of similarity by the 1990s in the overall level of cleavage voting within all six countries. As

illustrated in Fig. 3, social cleavage voting tends to center closely around an index score of .05, implying that the average political difference for a given pair of social groups is approximately 10%. Moreover, the small but significant trends affecting Britain, Germany, Australia, and the US has accentuated this cross-national similarity.<sup>27</sup>

Complementing this emerging portrait of social cleavages, a further set of findings concerns the modest contribution of such cleavages to understanding the overall sources of voter alignments. Using McFadden's  $R^2$  as a summary approximation of variance explained in our preferred models, we arrive at the following values: .11 (Australia), .10 (Austria), .05 (Great Britain), .07 (Germany), .14 (Netherlands), and .07 (US). Taken together, these results are relevant to advancing ongoing debate over the nature of changes in social cleavage-based voter alignments and their relationship to other aspects of contemporary political change.

## 6. Discussion

Comparative and historical analysis visibly broadens scholarly debates, but past research on the impact of social cleavages has been constrained by either significant methodological limitations or a tendency to limit hypothesis testing to single countries. Virtually no previous studies have attempted to test hypotheses about social cleavage impacts in comparative context using a fully differentiated party family scheme and a multi-category typology of cleavages. The relatively broad scope of our analyses, covering six advanced capitalist democracies for a 30 year period, provides a new perspective from which to address these questions. While future investigations will be needed to refine the understandings developed here, we have shown the possibilities for systematic comparative-historical investigation, and we welcome further work that spans additional countries and time periods as a means of advancing research on cleavage voting in capitalist democracies.

It is critical to emphasize, in this context, the relevance of the time period covered by our analyses to debates and unresolved controversies over trends in social cleavage-based voting within capitalist democracies. In particular, the theoretical underpinnings of most predictions concerning a decline or displacement of cleavage voting identify historical factors and novel processes that are hypothesized as emerging primarily during the historical era *since* the 1960s. These would include the following: new left-libertarian (and neo-conservative or new right) movements; novel (or re-emergent) ideological conflicts concerning issues of rights, the environment, and the character of civil society; recent patterns of postindustrial change; partisan volatility affecting left and other previously-dominant parties during the 1980s; and per-

<sup>27</sup> We emphasize again that more detailed analyses using different data find a pattern of over-time decline in the magnitude of the US class cleavage (see Manza and Brooks, 1999). Notwithstanding this difference, that research (and the current study) both find no evidence for over-time decline in the magnitude of the *overall* social cleavage in the US.

haps more recently, the maturation of globalization and transnational processes (e.g., Franklin et al., 1992; Clark et al., 1993; Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993; Pakulski and Waters, 1996). Accordingly, while it could thus be hypothesized that social cleavage voting within specific countries was possibly *higher* prior to the decade of the 1960s, if true, that line of argumentation might also call into question much of the theoretical basis for anticipating contemporary patterns of cleavage decline. Further research, then, situating the post-1960s era within a longer time frame, while employing suitable measures and methods for the study of social cleavages, may thus help to refine scholarly understanding of the historical origins and magnitude of trends in cleavage-based voting.

The substantive findings of this study help to advance recent debates concerning the continuing significance vs. declining relevance of social cleavages to voter alignments and political conflict within capitalist democracies (see Evans (2000) for a recent review). Widely proclaimed assertions regarding the existence of working-class dealignment and its significant consequences for declining cleavage voting within Western democracies are partially supported by these analyses. More specifically, in four of the six countries we have investigated, unskilled workers, traditionally the bulwark of Left party support, have evolved over time to more closely resemble the *average* voter, making their partisan political alignments far less distinctive, and potentially providing far less incentive for left politicians to develop policies designed to appeal (disproportionately) to unskilled workers.

By the same token, however, we find no evidence for a universal decline in the partisan relevance of social cleavages, including class in the post-1960s era. While some countries in our analyses conform to the declining cleavage scenario (Britain, Germany, and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Netherlands), others show some tendency toward a growing magnitude of social cleavages as a whole (Australia and the US), and one country (Austria) has experienced a pattern of stability coupled with a very recent increase. This larger pattern is visible in part because we have simultaneously examined trends among three major social cleavages. This enables various refinements to the overall picture of social cleavages in democracies. For example, we find that cleavage decline in Britain and Germany is a product of decreases in the magnitude of a single cleavage (class); gender and religion-based differences in voter alignments have experienced little change within these two countries.

As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the existing scholarly literatures on social cleavages and political behavior is characterized by a sharply polarized debate between scholars who consistently assert decline vs. those who categorically reject such a scenario. Taken as a whole, however, our results suggest an important limitation of these polarized interpretations. Indeed, the clear association between country context and the extent and type of social cleavage change establishes a pattern of cross-national complexity with respect to which past debates over cleavage decline appear ill-suited to understand.

Following an emerging strain of commentary on political-sociological research on voting behavior (Evans, 1999; Evans and Whitefield, 1999; Weakliem and Heath, 1999), our results suggest the utility of more detailed and systematic comparisons between countries as a means of advancing debates. In addition to developing such

comparisons, further research may be able to shed productive light by considering the potential relevance of such factors as nation-specific electoral systems (Powell, 2000), welfare state type (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; O'Connor et al., 1999), other long-standing sources of party-based political cleavages (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Kitschelt, 1994), and public opinion (e.g., Page and Shapiro, 1992; Powell, 2000).

Cross-national differences in trends affecting social cleavages also cast significant doubt on the other interpretive pole of recent debates, namely, that the institutionalization of social group-based conflict within capitalist societies renders them impervious to any process of change affecting voter alignments. While the class cleavage has not declined universally, four of the six countries investigated in this study show clear evidence of working-class dealignment, and the very large decline of class voting is inconsistent with expectations of persistence within all Western democracies. Generic expectations of stability also provide little basis for understanding countries such as Australia and the US in which the magnitude of specific social cleavages has increased.

Our results also suggest a degree of similarity in the average size of overall social cleavages within the six democracies we have investigated. Indeed, we find that country-specific patterns of cleavage change have lead to growing comparability in the magnitude of the overall social cleavage: By the mid-1990s, the average difference between two social groups in the probability of favoring a given party family was approximately .10. Although such estimates represent a non-trivial difference in political behavior (and some pairwise contrasts produce much larger differences), we would caution against over-estimating their magnitude. The quite large deviance remaining after estimating our preferred models suggests the further importance of other sources of the vote. Given these results, further research and debate, including with respect to related debates concerning political change (Brooks et al., 2003), may profit by broadening its scope to consider other factors behind the partisan alignments of voters.

## Appendix A

### List of original datasets

Study	Type of study	No. of cases	Archive	Archive No.
AUS65	Other	1925	SSDA	M168
AUS67	Other	2054	ICPSR	07282
AUS73	Other	4939	SSDA	M169
AUS79	Other	2016	SSDA	M170
AUS84E	NES	3012	SSDA	M171
AUS85I	ISSP	1528	ZA	1490
AUS86I	ISSP	1250	ZA	1620
AUS87E	NES	1825	SSDA	445
AUS87I	ISSP	1663	ZA	1680
AUS90E	NES	2037	SSDA	570
AUS92I	ISSP	2203	ZA	2310

**Appendix A** (continued)

Study	Type of study	No. of cases	Archive	Archive No.
AUS93E	NES	3023	SSDA	763
AUS96E	NES	1797	SSDA	943
AUS98E	NES	1897	SSDA	1001
AUT74P	Pol.Act.	1585	ICPSR	7777
AUT85I	ISSP	987	ZA	1490
AUT88I	ISSP	972	ZA	1700
AUT89I	ISSP	1997	ZA	1840
AUT91I	ISSP	984	ZA	2150
AUT94I	ISSP	977	ZA	2620
AUT95I	ISSP	1007	ZA	2880
ENG64E	NES	1769	ICPSR	7250
ENG66E	NES	1874	ICPSR	7250
ENG70E	NES	1355	ICPSR	7004
ENG740	NES	2365	UK-DA	0666
ENG79E	NES	1893	UK-DA	1533
ENG83E	NES	3955	UK-DA	2005
ENG85I	ISSP	1530	ZA	1490
ENG86I	ISSP	1416	ZA	1620
ENG87E	NES	3826	UK-DA	2568
ENG87I	ISSP	1212	ZA	1680
ENG88I	ISSP	2614	ZA	1700
ENG89I	ISSP	2594	ZA	1840
ENG90I	ISSP	1197	ZA	1950
ENG91I	ISSP	1257	ZA	2150
ENG92I	ISSP	1066	ZA	2310
ENG92E	NES	3534	DA	2981
ENG93I	ISSP	1261	ZA	2450
ENG94I	ISSP	984	ZA	2620
ENG95I	ISSP	1058	ZA	2880
ENG97I	ISSP	1087	ZA	3090
GER69E	NES	939	ZA	0525
GER69F	NES	1158	ZA	7098
GER75P	Pol.Act.	2307	ICPSR	07777
GER76Z	ZUBUS	2036	ZA	1233
GER77Z	ZUBUS	2002	ZA	1233
GER78C	ZUBUS	2030	ZA	1233
GER78X	ZUBUS	2012	ZA	1233
GER79X	ZUBUS	2007	ZA	1233
GER79Z	ZUBUS	2012	ZA	1233
GER80A	ZUBUS	2955	ZA	1795
GER80C	ZUBUS	1939	ZA	1233
GER80P	Pol.Act.	2095	ZA	1188
GER80Z	ZUBUS	1997	ZA	1233
GER82A	GSS	2991	ZA	1795
GER84A	GSS	3004	ZA	1795
GER86A	GSS	3095	ZA	1795
GER88A	GSS	3052	ZA	1795
GER90A	GSS	3051	ZA	1800
GER91A	GSS	3058	ZA	1990
GER92A	GSS	3548	ZA	2140
GER94A	GSS	3450	ZA	2400

(continued on next page)

**Appendix A** *(continued)*

Study	Type of study	No. of cases	Archive	Archive No.
GER96A	GSS	2800	ZA	2800
GER98A	GSS	3234	ZA	3000
NET70	NES	1838	STEIN	P1036
NET71	NES	906	ICPSR	7768
NET72E	NES	3175	STEIN	P0353
NET74P	Pol.Act	1201	ICPSR	7777
NET76	Other	755	STEIN	P0653
NET77E	NES	1856	STEIN	P0354
NET77L	Other	4159	STEIN	P0328
NET79P	Pol.Act	806	ZA	1188
NET81E	NES	2305	STEIN	P0350
NET82E	NES	1541	STEIN	P0633
NET85S	Other	3003	STEIN	P1012
NET86E	NES	1630	STEIN	P0866
NET87	Other	795	STEIN	P1194
NET89E	NES	1745	STEIN	P1000
NET89M	Other	956	STEIN	P1098
NET90S	Other	2384	STEIN	P1100
NET94E	NES	1812	STEIN	P1208
NET96	Other	790	STEIN	P1370
NET97I	ISSP	2267	ZA	3090
NET98E	NES	2101	STEIN	P1415
USA64E	NES	1834	ICPSR	07235
USA66E	NES	1291	ICPSR	07259
USA68E	NES	1673	ICPSR	07281
USA70E	NES	1694	ICPSR	07298
USA72G	GSS	1613	ICPSR	09505
USA73G	GSS	1504	ICPSR	09505
USA74G	GSS	1484	ICPSR	09505
USA74P	Pol.Act	1719	ICPSR	07777
USA75G	GSS	1490	ICPSR	09505
USA76G	GSS	1499	ICPSR	09505
USA77G	GSS	1530	ICPSR	09505
USA78G	GSS	1532	ICPSR	09505
USA80G	GSS	1468	ICPSR	09505
USA82G	GSS	1860	ICPSR	09505
USA83G	GSS	1599	ICPSR	09505
USA84G	GSS	1473	ICPSR	09505
USA85G	GSS	1534	ICPSR	09505
USA86G	GSS	1470	ICPSR	09505
USA87G	GSS	1819	ICPSR	09505
USA88G	GSS	1481	ICPSR	09505
USA89G	GSS	1537	ICPSR	09505
USA90G	GSS	1372	ICPSR	09505
USA91G	GSS	1517	ICPSR	2685
USA93G	GSS	1606	ICPSR	2685
USA94G	GSS	2992	ICPSR	2685
USA96G	GSS	2904	ICPSR	2685
USA98G	GSS	2832	ICPSR	2685



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## Appendix B

### Party families and political parties by country

Party family	Party name
<b>Australia<sup>a</sup></b>	
Left	Communist Party, Australian Labor Party, Queensland Labor Party, Lang Labor Party
Liberal	Australia Party, Liberal Movement, National Alliance, Service Party of Australia, Australian Democrats, Country-Liberal Party
Other	The Greens, <sup>a</sup> Tasmanian Greens, <sup>a</sup> Western Australia Greens, <sup>a</sup> Queensland Greens, <sup>a</sup> Victorian Greens <sup>a</sup> National Party Call to Australia Party, Democratic Labor Party, Australian Liberal Party, Other Parties
<b>Austria<sup>b</sup></b>	
Left	Communist Party Socialist
Green	United Greens of Austria, Alternative List, Green Alternative

**Appendix B (continued)**

Party family	Party name
Liberal	Liberal Forum
Religious	Austrian Peoples Party
Other <sup>b</sup>	Association of Members of the Social Security System, No-Citizens' Initiative against the Sale of Austria, Czechs, National Socialist, German Workers' Party, Hitler movement, Fatherland Front, Democratic Progressive Party, Freedom Party, Other Parties
<b>Germany</b>	
Left	German Communist Party, German Peace Union, Action for Democratic Progress Party of Democratic Socialism, Social Democrats, All-German People's Party
Green	Greens, Ecological Democratic Party, Alliance 90-Greens
Liberal	Free Democrats
Religious	Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union
Other	Centre Party, All-German Party, German Social Union, The Greys, Bavarian Party, South Schleswig Voters' League, Refugee Party, Federal Union Economic Reconstruction League, German Reich Party, National Democratic Party, Republicans, German Party, Other Parties
<b>The Netherlands<sup>c</sup></b>	
Left	Communist Party, Netherlands Labour Party, Democratic Socialists '70, Pacifist Socialist Party, Socialist Party, Green Left, <sup>c</sup> Greens <sup>c</sup>
Liberal	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, Democrats 66
Religious	Anti-Revolutionary Party, Catholic People's Party, Christian Historical Union, Political Reformed Party, Catholic National Party, Reformed Political Union, Radical Political Party, Roman Catholic Party, Christian Democratic Appeal, Reformed Political Federation, Evangelical People's Party
Other	Centre Party, Centre Democrats, People's Party of the Right, Middle Class Party, United Old Persons' League, 55 + Union, Other Parties
<b>United Kingdom<sup>c</sup></b>	
Left	Communist Party, Independent Labour Party, Labour Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party, Green Party <sup>c</sup>
Liberal	Liberal Party, Liberal Democrat Party
Conservative	Conservative Party, National Liberal Party
Other	National Front, Sinn Féin, Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales), Scottish National Party, Other Party
<b>United States</b>	
Liberal	Democratic Party
Conservative	Republican Party
Other	Communist Party <sup>d</sup> Socialist Labor Party <sup>d</sup> Socialist Party <sup>d</sup> Progressive Party <sup>d</sup> Progressive Party (H. Wallace), <sup>d</sup> American Party, Independent (J. Anderson), Independent (Ross Perot), Libertarian Party, Other Party

<sup>a</sup> The very small number of Green party family supporters in Australia are combined with Other.

<sup>b</sup> The very small number of Other party family supporters in Austria are treated as "non-voters" and deleted from the analyses.

<sup>c</sup> In the Netherlands and Great Britain the very small number of Green party family supporters are combined with Left party.

<sup>d</sup> In the US, third and independent candidates are combined in the Other category.

## Appendix C

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in Australia ( $N = 17,944$ )

Independent variables	Other vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Left party family
<i>Constant</i>	-.54* (.20)	2.45* (.15)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1979)		
1984	1.48* (.24)	.43* (.19)
1985	.66* (.26)	-.14 (.20)
1986	2.55* (.26)	.17 (.22)
1987	1.52* (.01)	-.52* (.16)
1990	-.33 (.22)	-.1.49* (.16)
1992	2.33* (.22)	-.33 (.18)
1993	2.80* (.22)	.01 (.18)
1995	2.21* (.21)	-.95* (.17)
1996	2.36* (.20)	-.89* (.18)
1998	2.33* (.22)	-.72* (.18)
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)		
Catholic	.52* (.09)	.48* (.09)
Protestant	.76* (.08)	.21* (.08)
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)		
Male	.30* (.07)	.40* (.07)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)		
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	-.44* (.10)	-.06 (.14)
Skilled manual workers	-.33* (.15)	.01 (.14)
Routine non-manual workers	-.12* (.10)	-.16* (.10)
Service class	-.48* (.08)	-.64* (.08)
Self-employed and farmers	2.00* (.46)	-.44* (.17)
<i>Interactions</i>		
Self-employed × year	-.06* (.02)	<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient estimate constrained to 0.

## Appendix D

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in Austria ( $N = 5754$ )

Independent variables	Left vs. Religious party family	Green vs. Religious party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family
<i>Constant</i>	-2.43* (.18)	-23.14* (.41)	-.63* (.25)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1974)			
1985	-.34* (.10)	21.23* (.41)	-.26 (.24)
1988	-.21 (.12)	22.64* (.40)	.02 (.26)
1989	-.06 (.09)	23.23* (.36)	1.03* (.18)

**Appendix D** (continued)

Independent variables	Left vs. Religious party family	Green vs. Religious party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family
1991	1.29* (.17)	23.03* (.38)	.86* (.20)
1994	.00 (.1 1)	23.16* (.38)	.48* (.22)
1995	−.06 (.12)	23.97* (.37)	1.92* (.18)
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)			
Catholic	−2.11* (.16)	−2.04* (.22)	−.1.88* (.20)
Protestant	−.1.43* (.22)	−.1.12* (.32)	−.50* (.27)
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)			
Male	.02 (.07)	.05 (.14)	.32* (.1 1)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)			
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	.44* (.1 1)	−.25 (.32)	.10 (.20)
Skilled manual workers	.61* (.12)	.03 (.30)	.61* (.18)
Routine non-manual workers	.08 (.10)	.83* (.19)	.27 (.17)
Service class	−.32* (.10)	.97* (.17)	−.02 (.16)
Self-employed and farmers	−.1.82* (.13)	−.1.13* (.33)	−.30 (.17)

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

**Appendix E**

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in Britain ( $N = 27,758$ )

Independent variables	Cons. vs. Left party family	Other vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Left party family
<i>Constant</i>	−.70* (.07)	−4.29* (.35)	−2.17* (.11)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1966)			
1970	.05 (.08)	.67 (.43)	−.10 (.15)
1974	.22* (.08)	1.92* (.36)	1.12* (.10)
1979	.67* (.08)	1.26* (.39)	1.01* (.13)
1983	.67* (.07)	1.35* (.37)	1.57* (.1 1)
1985	.04 (.09)	1.02* (.40)	.63* (.13)
1986	.19* (.09)	1.66* (.38)	.66* (.13)
1987	.61* (.07)	1.30* (.36)	1.53* (.1 1)
1988	.33* (.08)	2.12* (.35)	.20 (.13)
1989	.52* (.08)	3.18* (.34)	.60* (.12)
1990	.13* (.10)	2.77* (.36)	.04 (.16)
1991	.41* (.09)	2.12* (.37)	1.00* (.14)
1992	.48* (.10)	2.42* (.37)	1.11* (.14)
1993	.29* (.09)	2.15* (.37)	.86* (.14)
1994	−.08 (.10)	1.94* (.38)	.82* (.14)
1995	−.19 (.10)	1.74* (.38)	.84* (.14)
1997	−.07 (.10)	1.97* (.38)	.57* (.15)
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)			
Catholic	−.22* (.05)	−.78* (.13)	−.35* (.07)
Protestant	.57* (.03)	−.16* (.07)	.35* (.04)

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**Appendix E** (continued)

Independent variables	Cons. vs. Left party family	Other vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Left party family
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)			
Male	-.04 (.03)	-.22* (.07)	-.14* (.04)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)			
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	-.85* (.12)	-.01 (.12)	-.15* (.07)
Skilled manual workers	-.62* (.05)	-.11 (.11)	-.34* (.06)
Routine non-manual workers	.18 (.11)	.36* (.11)	.49* (.06)
Service class	.70* (.04)	.43* (.10)	.81* (.05)
Self-employed and farmers	1.52* (.18)	.61* (.18)	.53* (.11)
<i>Interactions</i>			
Un/semi-skilled manual worker × year	.02* (.01)	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>
Routine non-manual workers × year	.01* (<.01)	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>
Self-employed × year	-.02* (.01)	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>	<u>    </u> <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient estimate constrained to 0.

**Appendix F**

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in Germany ( $N = 39,874$ )

Independent variables	Left vs. Religious party family	Green vs. Religious party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family	
<i>Constant</i>	.92* (.07)	-24.83* (.15)	-2.43* (.22)	-1.73* (.14)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1969)				
1975	-.09 (.08)	-16.12* (<.01)	-1.37* (.38)	.99* (.15)
1976	-.03 (.08)	-16.05* (<.01)	-.22 (.28)	1.26* (.15)
1977	-.06 (.08)	-16.12* (<.01)	-.84* (.34)	.82* (.16)
1978	.00 (.07)	-16.09* (<.01)	.75* (.21)	1.00* (.15)
1979	-.07 (.07)	-16.16* (<.01)	-1.19* (.31)	.69* (.15)
1980	.04 (.06)	23.51* (.16)	-1.43* (.27)	1.17* (.14)
1982	-.62* (.07)	24.18* (.16)	-1.57* (.37)	.90* (.15)
1984	-.19* (.08)	24.41* (.16)	-1.80* (.42)	.16 (.17)
1986	.00 (.08)	24.49* (.16)	-1.38* (.38)	.72* (.16)
1987	-.06 (.10)	24.19* (.16)	-.52 (.39)	.70* (.19)
1988	.13 (.08)	24.35* (.17)	-.14 (.27)	.58* (.17)
1990	.09 (.08)	24.42* (.16)	.33 (.24)	.96* (.15)
1991	-.32* (.08)	23.80* (.17)	-.23 (.26)	1.03* (.15)
1992	-.19* (.08)	24.20* (.17)	.21 (.23)	.81* (.15)
1994	.14 (.08)	24.65* (.16)	1.05* (.22)	.89* (.16)
1996	-.26* (.08)	24.22* (.16)	-.03 (.24)	.46* (.16)
1998	.15 (.08)	24.00* (.17)	.60* (.23)	-.01 (.17)
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)				
Catholic	-1.39* (.04)	-1.56* (.07)	-1.20* (.11)	-1.31* (.05)
Protestant	-.52* (.04)	-.87* (.06)	-.84* (.10)	-.35* (.06)

**Appendix F (continued)**

Independent variables	Left vs. Religious party family	Green vs. Religious party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family	
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)				
Male	−.03 (.03)	−.19* (.08)	.43* (.08)	−.04 (.04)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)				
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	.88* (.09)	.31* (.08)	.50* (.11)	.18* (.07)
Skilled manual workers	.85* (.12)	.03 (.11)	.45* (.15)	.07 (.08)
Routine non-manual workers	.06 (.04)	.34* (.08)	.26 (.15)	.37* (.06)
Service Class	.04 (.03)	−.05 (.24)	−.20 (.12)	.68* (.05)
Self-employed and farmers	−1.31* (.07)	−.59* (.14)	−.20 (.19)	.12 (.08)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Un/semi-skilled manual worker × year	−.02* (< .01)	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>
Skilled manual worker × year	−.03* (.01)	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>
Service class × year	— <sup>b</sup>	.03* (.01)	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient estimate constrained to 0.

**Appendix G**

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in Netherlands ( $N = 21,008$ )

Independent variables	Other vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family
<i>Constant</i>	1.50* (.10)	−2.87* (.35)	1.11* (.10)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1970)			
1971	−.17 (.13)	.76 (.42)	−.43* (.13)
1972	.08 (.09)	1.31* (.34)	−.33* (.10)
1974	.55* (.11)	1.57* (.38)	−.21 (.12)
1977	.30* (.08)	.87* (.35)	.08 (.09)
1979	.31* (.14)	.08 (.66)	.12 (.13)
1981	.14 (.13)	.33 (.53)	.13 (.13)
1982	.36* (.13)	.32 (.56)	.18 (.13)
1985	.28* (.11)	1.99* (.36)	−.06 (.11)
1986	.06 (.13)	1.02* (.44)	−.45* (.14)
1989	−.10 (.15)	1.04* (.45)	−.59* (.15)
1990	−.64* (.13)	2.59* (.36)	−.33* (.12)
1994	.19 (.16)	3.73* (.37)	.58* (.15)
1996	.04 (.18)	3.51* (.39)	.57* (.17)
1998	.45* (.16)	3.58* (.38)	.34* (.16)

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**Appendix G** (continued)

Independent variables	Other vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Left party family	Liberal vs. Religious party family
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)			
Catholic	−3.39* (.12)	−1.50* (.29)	−2.55* (.13)
Protestant	−2.51* (.12)	−1.36* (.30)	−2.06* (.13)
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)			
Male	.26* (.08)	−.29* (.08)	−.05 (.04)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)			
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	.32* (.07)	.32* (.16)	−.54* (.15)
Skilled manual workers	.46* (.07)	.66* (.15)	−.65* (.15)
Routine non-manual workers	.05 (.06)	.17 (.13)	.39* (.18)
Service class	−.19* (.06)	.31* (.10)	.52* (.05)
Self-employed and farmers	−1.22* (.11)	1.83* (.45)	.29* (.08)
<i>Interactions</i>			
Un/semi-skilled manual worker × year	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>	.03* (<.01)
Skilled manual workers × year	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>	.03* (<.01)
Self-employed × year	— <sup>b</sup>	−.12* (.03)	— <sup>b</sup>
Male × year	−.01* (<.01)	— <sup>b</sup>	— <sup>b</sup>
Catholic × year	.04* (<.01)	−.03* (.01)	.02* (<.01)
Protestant × year	<−.01 (<.01)	−.04* (.01)	<−.01 (<.01)

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient estimate constrained to 0.

**Appendix H**

Multinomial logistic regression coefficients<sup>a</sup> (SE in parentheses) for preferred model of social cleavages in the US ( $N = 39,789$ )

Independent variables	Liberal vs. Cons. party family	Other vs. Cons. party family
<i>Constant</i>	1.63* (.07)	−4.81* (.71)
<i>Year</i> (reference = 1964)		
1966	−.28* (.11)	−38.50 (>.01)
1968	−1.00* (.08)	3.97* (.71)
1970	−.70* (.20)	2.01* (.74)
1972	−1.32* (.08)	2.01* (.73)
1973	−1.49* (.08)	2.57* (.73)
1974	−1.49* (.07)	2.85* (.72)
1975	−1.34* (.08)	2.78* (.72)
1976	−1.29* (.08)	3.22* (.72)

**Appendix H** (continued)

Independent variables	Liberal vs. Cons. party family	Other vs. Cons. party family
1977	-.59* (.08)	1.92* (.72)
1978	-.73* (.08)	2.55* (.73)
1980	-.64* (.08)	2.53* (.73)
1982	-.64* (.08)	2.47* (.73)
1983	-.92* (.08)	2.00* (.74)
1984	-.94* (.08)	2.12* (.73)
1985	-1.37* (.08)	1.96* (.73)
1986	-1.34* (.09)	2.12* (.73)
1987	-.90* (.08)	2.29* (.73)
1988	-1.40* (.09)	2.45* (.73)
1989	-1.13* (.09)	2.31* (.72)
1990	-1.49* (.09)	2.10* (.73)
1991	-1.43* (.09)	2.10* (.73)
1993	-.61* (.09)	4.67* (.73)
1994	-.50* (.08)	4.65* (.71)
1996	-.50* (.08)	4.46* (.71)
1998	-.12* (.08)	4.45* (.71)
<i>Religious group</i> (reference = no religion)		
Catholic	-.23* (.06)	-.71* (.07)
Protestant	-.71* (.04)	-.79* (.06)
<i>Gender</i> (reference = female)		
Male	-.02 (.05)	.22* (.05)
<i>Class category</i> (reference = non-labor force)		
Un/semi-skilled manual workers	.01 (.10)	.49* (.08)
Skilled manual workers	-.35* (.10)	.45* (.08)
Routine non-manual workers	-.22* (.08)	.25* (.07)
Service class	-.05 (.07)	-.08 (.06)
Self-employed and farmers	2.94* (.47)	.10 (.10)
<i>Interactions</i>		
Un/semi-skilled manual workers × year	-.01* (<.01)	— <sup>b</sup>
Skilled manual workers × year	-.01* (<.01)	— <sup>b</sup>
Male × year	-.01* (<.01)	— <sup>b</sup>
Catholic × year	-.01* (<.01)	— <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> An asterisk next to a coefficient denotes significance at the .05 level (2-tailed test).

<sup>b</sup> Coefficient estimate constrained to 0.

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